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Abstract. E-government is one of the most rapidly evolving service domains in 
the contemporary information society. Many governments have already devel-
oped and provided e-government services to businesses and citizens. Nowadays 
actors in the government domain attempt to take the next step and exploit the 
latest wireless technologies in order to provide ubiquitous services for mobile 
users. However, this approach involves some hidden risks mainly due to the in-
herent insecurity of the air medium and the vulnerabilities of the wireless sys-
tems. Thus, in this paper we investigate the security gaps and considerations 
which should be taken into account for an m-government system. Finally, we 
provide a list of security guidelines and policies, which the users of the system 
should be aware of and follow in order to avoid security attacks.  
Keywords: m-government, mobile security, security architectures, security 
policies. 
1   Introduction 
Electronic government (e-government) is a very promising challenge for national 
governments and governmental agencies of any level. E-government refers to the use 
of information and communication technologies for transforming the interactions 
among governments (G2G), governments and businesses (G2B), governments and 
citizens (G2C) and governments and their employees (G2E). E-government can con-
tribute to the improvement of government services delivery to citizens, the facilitation 
of interactions with businesses and the empowerment of citizens through the access to 
information and services. Resulting benefits include less corruption, increased trans-
parency, greater convenience, revenue growth, and cost reductions (The World Bank, 
2004). The potential advantages of e-government impel governments around the 
world to strongly support it. Many of them have already invested greatly on their e-
government agenda. In the race for achieving full transformation of governmental 
services, governments are making efforts to provide more services in alternative 
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channels, in this way increasing variety and quality of services as well as citizen par-
ticipation. In this context, the explosion of use of wireless devices is forcing govern-
ments to shift from e-government to mobile government (m-Government).  
M-government can be considered as a strategy, the implementation of which involves 
the use of all kinds of wireless and mobile technologies, applications and devices for 
improving service delivery to the parties involved in e-government including citizens, 
businesses and all government units. Similarly to e-government, m-government operates 
on four different levels represented by the following interactions: (a) m-government to 
government (mG2G) referring to inter-agency relationships and the interaction between 
governmental agencies; (b) m-government to business (mG2B) describing the interaction 
of government with businesses; (c) m-government to employee (mG2E) concerning the 
government and its employees; and (d) m-government to citizen (mG2C), which refers to 
the interaction between government and citizens. The main advantages of m-government 
services are ubiquity, namely providing information and services anywhere and at any-
time, personalization, ease of use, time and cost saving and location-based services. 
Many countries are offering m-government services, such as the USA, the UK, Singa-
pore, Malaysia and Australia. Also, there are various examples concerning each type of 
interaction regarding different sectors of society, such as education, public safety, justice 
and employment. It should be noted that m-government services require radically differ-
ent approach for service design, development, operation and interaction model.    
Nevertheless, the provision of such services alone does not insure that citizens and 
businesses will use them. The emergence of e-government and m-government services 
has raised various issues, among which security is of great importance. In order to fully 
exploit the benefits of e-government, there is a number of special security requirements 
which are dictated by the sensitive nature of the data transmitted during e-government 
transactions. These data may include personal data, such as identity and contact details, 
government data, such as record / registration numbers and certificates, as well as finan-
cial data, such as credit card and bank account numbers. Therefore, it is imperative that in 
an e-government transaction the involved parties are mutually and securely authenticated, 
and the information is transmitted with confidentiality and integrity. These security re-
quirements have become even more crucial with the advent of m-government. The main 
reason is that the wireless interfaces have some proven security deficiencies in compari-
son with wired ones. Furthermore, the constantly increasing storage and processing capa-
bilities of mobile devices have attracted the attention of malicious programmers.   
Hence, this paper aims at investigating the various methods for securing an m-
government system. More specifically, we analyze some known security gaps of the 
most widely deployed mobile networks and we present an overview of the security 
mechanisms deployed in handheld devices.  
2   Mobile Security Gap Analysis 
During the last decade, wireless network technologies have greatly evolved and have 
been able to provide cost-effective solutions for voice and/or data mobile services. 
Their main advantages over wired networks are that they avoid expensive cabling 
infrastructure and they support user mobility and effective broadcasting. As a result, 
wireless networks managed to take over a large percentage of the “voice” market, as 
 Security Issues in mGovernment 267 
the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) technology promoted the 
worldwide expansion of mobile telephony. Furthermore, nowadays the Internet has 
become a necessity for many individual users and businesses and the main challenge 
is to find cost-effective solutions for the provision of wireless services. Hence, a large 
research community has been involved in designing and implementing standards for 
wireless data networks and there are some technologies, such as Wi-Fi and General 
Packet Radio Service (GPRS), which have already been widely adopted. In the years 
to come, more and more of our voice samples and data packets will be transmitted 
over wireless links and therefore it becomes imperative that these data are secured 
from malicious eavesdroppers and hackers. Especially in application domains such as 
m-government, it is of crucial importance to prevent the revelation of sensitive data to 
non-authorized persons or the submission of unauthorized data. Therefore, the main 
objectives of this section are to investigate the available security mechanisms of 
handheld devices and to analyze the security gaps of wireless protocols.  
2.1   Security Principles  
Wireless network security is the scientific field dealing with the risks related to wire-
less computer networks. In order to clearly identify the kind of protection a security 
system or algorithm provides, the security goals are categorized as follows:  
 
? Confidentiality: ensures that information is not disclosed to unauthorized users.  
? Integrity: ensures that the information cannot be corrupted or altered in any way. 
? Accountability / Non-repudiation: guarantees for the identity of the sending and 
receiving party in an information transmission. 
? Availability: ensures that the services implemented in a system are available and 
function properly.  
? Access control: ensures that only authenticated / authorized entities are able to 
access services and data. More specifically, the access control security goal can 
be further categorized in the following sub-goals:  
o Authentication: confirms the claimed user identity.  
o Authorization: controls the access rights granted to authenticated users.  
2.2   Handheld Devices  
Handheld devices (e.g mobile phones, smart phones, Personal Digital Assistants-
PDAs) have gained popularity because of the technological advancements of the last 
decade. Longer battery life, larger storage capacity and faster processing capabilities 
have promoted handheld devices to a worthy substitute of the personal computers 
when users go “mobile”. However, along with great power comes great responsibility. 
In this case, the responsibility is to devise and apply security standards for handheld 
devices, which are equivalent to these of the personal computers. In this context,  
the security requirements for the handheld devices are affected by two main deficien-
cies with respect to personal desktop computers: firstly, the handheld devices are 
much more vulnerable to loss or theft due to their mobility and their small dimen-
sions. Secondly and more importantly, they mainly use the air medium to gain access 
268 M. Kumar, M. Hanumanthappa, and B.L. Reddy 
to networks, which is inherently more insecure and prone to eavesdropping than tradi-
tional wired lines.  
In order for the device to be secured against loss or theft, it has to incorporate suf-
ficient access control mechanisms to protect stored data and functionality. Unfortu-
nately, there seems to be no widely accepted standard for access control services in 
handheld devices and there seems to be no consensus over standard access control 
routines in the various mobile device operating systems. The main security goals that 
need to be achieved with respect to device security are authentication and authoriza-
tion. In the domain of authentication, the following mechanisms are utilized for hand-
held devices:  
 
? Password protection: A private value known only by authorised users in order to 
authenticate them. It is often synonymous with the concept of Personal Identifica-
tion Number (PIN) code.  
? Biometrics: A hardware based solution that examines a physical attribute of an 
authorized user in order to authenticate him (e.g. fingerprint reader, 
voice/handwriting recognition).  
? Auto Logout: The authenticated user is automatically logged off after a prede-
fined time interval or inactivity period.  
 
In the domain of authorization, the following mechanisms are utilized:  
 
? File Masking: The system prevents certain protected records from being viewed 
without user authentication.  
? Access Control Lists: Permissions for a particular object are associated with users 
in the form of a matrix.  
? Role-based Access Control: Permissions are associated with roles and users get 
associated with roles. Users therefore inherit the permissions of the roles they are 
assigned to.   
 
In most of the cases, handheld devices do not incorporate all of the aforementioned 
mechanisms. Password or PIN protection is the most common mechanism, although 
biometric mechanisms, such as fingerprint readers have made their appearance. The 
authentication of the user to the handheld device takes in most cases- place through a 
password challenge or a biometric measure and after successful completion full ac-
cess is granted to the device’s applications and data. In other words, in the majority of 
the cases handheld devices incorporate no authorization mechanisms at all. This is 
mainly due to the fact that since the handheld device is typically a personal device, 
authentication is equivalent to authorization. Nevertheless, this is not the case when 
the device belongs to an employee of a corporation, because the device’s data are ac-
tually owned by the corporation and the disclosure of sensitive data could cause seri-
ous financial damage to the business.   
2.3   Mobile Networks  
As mentioned before, the second main security deficiency of handheld devices is  
that they use the air interface to gain access to networks, which is inherently more 
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insecure and prone to eavesdropping than traditional wired lines. This is mainly be-
cause any transceiver in the radio coverage of the mobile device can capture transmit-
ted traffic or inject its own data in the communication link. Therefore, wireless links 
facilitate passive as well as active attacks (e.g. replay, man-in-the-middle, DoS at-
tacks). This fact has led to the exposure of security vulnerabilities in the air interface 
protocols of some well-known wireless protocols:  
 
• Bluetooth – IEEE 802.15 :-  
There are three types of potential vulnerabilities with respect to the Bluetooth stan-
dard, version 1.0B. The first vulnerability opens up the system to an attack in which 
an adversary under certain circumstances is able to determine the key exchanged by 
two victim devices, making eavesdropping and impersonation possible. The second 
vulnerability makes possible an attack in which an attacker is able to identify and  
determine the geographic location of victim devices. Finally, the third vulnerability 
concerns deficiencies of the security cipher itself. Furthermore, in August 2004 an 
experiment (Trifinite, 2004) proved that the range of Bluetooth radios could be ex-
tended to 1.78 km with high-gain directional antennas. This technique which is also 
known as Bluetooth sniping poses a potential security threat since it allows attackers 
to access vulnerable Bluetooth devices from a safe position far away from the victim. 
In addition, a group of security researchers from Cambridge University (Wong et al., 
2005) have presented an actual implementation of passive attacks against the PIN-
based pairing between commercial Bluetooth devices, which confirmed that the Blue-
tooth's symmetric key establishment method is vulnerable. Finally, Shaked & Wool ( 
2005) have demonstrated both passive and active methods for obtaining the PIN for a 
Bluetooth link. The passive attack allows a suitably equipped attacker to eavesdrop on 
communications and spoof if he was present at the time of initial pairing. The active 
method utilizes a special message which prompts the master and slave devices to re-
peat the pairing process. After that, the first method may be used to crack the PIN. 
The aforementioned vulnerabilities pose a serious question on the security of Blue-
tooth links and about their ability to carry sensitive data. Although the Bluetooth se-
curity specifications have been revised quite a few times in the past, a large number of 
older version Bluetooth devices is still utilized and suffers from the aforementioned 
security risks.  
 
• Wi-Fi – IEEE 802.11  
The first encryption standard used for Wi-Fi was Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). 
Unfortunately, WEP has been proved to be breakable on many publications (Borisov 
et al., 2001) even when correctly configured. This is because of a vulnerability of the 
RC4 cryptographic algorithm of WEP, which utilizes the RC4 initialization vectors 
improperly (Stubblefield et al., 2002). Although most new wireless products support 
the much improved Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) protocol, most of the first genera-
tion access points, which are widely deployed, cannot be upgraded and have to be 
replaced in order to support the improved standard. The security standard published 
by the IEEE802.11i group (aka WPA2) in June 2004 offers a still further improved 
security scheme, which is gradually becoming available on the latest equipment. Due 
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to these vulnerabilities, many Wi-Fi providers deploy additional layers of encryption 
(such as Virtual Private Networks-VPNs) to enhance the wireless security.   
 
• GPRS - GSM  
GSM was designed with a moderate level of security. The system is designed to au-
thenticate the subscriber to the network using shared-secret cryptography. Neverthe-
less, GSM has no provision for authenticating the network, namely the base station to 
the subscriber’s terminal. Furthermore, communication between the subscriber and 
the base station can be encrypted, using temporary keys assigned with respect to the 
terminal’s identification code. Therefore, the security model offers confidentiality and 
authentication, but limited authorization capabilities and no non-repudiation. GSM 
uses several cryptographic algorithms for securing the communication link. The A5/1 
and A5/2 stream ciphers are utilized to encrypt the voice channels over the air inter-
face. A5/1 was first developed and is a stronger algorithm used within Europe and the 
United States. A5/2 is weaker and used in other countries. Serious vulnerabilities (Bi-
ham & Dunkelman, 2000; Biryukov et al., 2000) have been found in both algorithms, 
and it is possible to break A5/2 in real-time in a ciphertext-only attack (Barkan et al., 
2003). Fortunately, GSM does not specify a single algorithm but it supports multiple 
algorithms so operators may replace that cipher with a stronger one.  
3   Security Mechanisms 
In the literature, there are several available security protocols architectures that can be 
applied on the different Open System Interconnection (OSI) layers. The purpose of 
these layer security approaches is the implementation of VPNs which can provide 
secure communication over unsecured networks. A formal definition of a VPN is the 
following: “A VPN is a logical computer network with restricted usage that is con-
structed from the system resources of a relatively public physical network (such as the 
Internet) with encryption of the used and tunneling links created by the virtual net-
work across the public network” (Schafer, 2003). More specifically, in the link layer 
there are a couple of security protocols such as PPTP (Hamzeh et al., 1999) and L2TP 
(Townsley et al., 1999) that can secure the transmission of the information independ-
ently of the air interface. In the network layer, a popular approach is to implement 
IPSec (Kent & Atkinson, 1998) in combination with mobile IP (Perkins, 1996). More 
specifically, IPSec is meant to provide the secure transmission of IP packets, whereas 
mobile IP aims at providing transparency to the transport layer by hiding the change 
of IP address when the user roams between different networks.  
However, security solutions in the link and network layer have the following dis-
advantages. Firstly, the specification of the link layer significantly varies in different 
kind of technologies, such as cellular technologies (e.g. GSM) compared to mobile 
broadband technologies(e.g Wi-Fi). This fact increases the complexity and the cost of 
adopting a link layer security solution. The aforementioned disadvantage is not an 
issue in the case of the network layer, since its purpose is actually to present a uni-
form and homogeneous network structure to the upper layers. In the majority of the 
modern packet-based data networks, the main protocol used in the network layer is IP. 
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Nevertheless, network layer security has also some serious shortcomings, since the 
system should rely on the network operator in order to utilize the security protocols.  
Moreover, different points of access in wireless telecommunications networks have 
different capabilities and restrictions in the kind of traffic that they allow. Therefore, 
network layer security is not able to guarantee smooth operation in every case. A 
preferable solution in the case of mobile-government is the session layer security. In 
the session layer, the following security protocols are available: Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL) / Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Shell (SSH). Although these pro-
tocols are often referred to as transport layer security protocols, they actually belong 
to the session layer within the meaning of the OSI model (Schafer, 2003). The main 
advantage of session layer security protocols is that they preserve their transparency 
with respect to the application and at the same time they can survive transport connec-
tion failures caused by TCP.  
These characteristics make session security protocols appropriate for securing 
wireless data communications, since they can be implemented end-to-end directly 
from the client to the server without interfering with the lower layers. Furthermore, 
the majority of operating systems available for handheld devices (e.g. Windows Mo-
bile, SymbianOS, PalmOS) either inherently support SSL/TLS functionality in their 
browsers or they can incorporate these functionalities through a third-party plug-in. 
The last candidate is application layer security, which actually implements the secu-
rity services (e.g. authentication, data confidentiality and integrity) as part of the ap-
plication. This approach could be appropriate for our scenario, but it was abandoned 
in favour of the session layer security since it significantly increases the complexity of 
the application development. Thus, the final decision was to deploy end-to-end ses-
sion security over wireless links. 
4   Policy Implications 
Even the most secure system in the world has a serious flaw, namely the human factor. In 
other words, security architectures are not of much use, unless people start realizing the 
risks involved in the information society. Information systems can greatly facilitate the 
everyday activates of our society, but at the same time they create new kind of security 
gaps which could attract malicious users. However, most of the times these security 
breaches are due to human error or negligence rather than system deficiency.  
Hence, we present a concise list of policies, which should be adopted by the users 
of m-government:  
 
• The user should ensure that the handheld device supports SSL/TLS session layer 
security and possibly VPN software. The SSL/TLS session layer security is util-
ized to access the https secure web pages of the portal and it is supported by the 
majority of the modern mobile web browsers. The VPN software is usually util-
ized to establish a tunnel between the mobile and the network access point, so 
that all traffic can pass securely through that tunnel. However, the availability 
and the provision of this service depend on the network operator and it cannot be 
considered as an integrated solution especially if the users roam through different 
networks.  
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• The registered users of the system should change their authentication credentials 
frequently. This is a common practice in web portals where security is of great 
concern (e.g. e-banking systems). Moreover, passwords are configured to expire 
after a predetermined time period in order to enforce this policy. This mechanism 
prevents users from storing the password in the web browsers, thus enhancing the 
authentication security of the portal. Furthermore, password-checking mecha-
nisms can be utilized in order to ensure that the user has not selected a common 
easy-to-guess password. This is usually achieved by forcing the user to select a 
password, which is at least eight characters long and it contains numbers, letters 
and symbols.  
• Storing sensitive information in the handheld device or in storage cards is not 
allowed unless it is encrypted. In this case sensitive information includes authen-
tication credentials, completed m-government forms etc. This information could 
be exposed to malicious users in case of device theft or loss. Thus, the users are 
advised to encrypt files which contain sensitive information. This can be 
achieved quite easily, since most modern mobile operating systems (e.g. Sym-
bian, Windows Mobile, PalmOS) either inherently support encryption routines or 
they can incorporate encryption functionalities through third-party software.  
• The user should empower the access control of the handheld device when possi-
ble. Every mobile device has different capabilities as far as access control is con-
cerned. The users are advised to enable the two common mechanisms which can 
be found in the majority of handheld devices, namely password protection and 
auto logout. If more advanced access control mechanisms such as biometrics and 
smartcards, are available, users are advised to utilize them in combination with 
password protection in order to achieve two-factor authentication.  
• Untrusted wireless network access points should be avoided. The users should 
configure the handheld device, so that it may not access unknown or untrusted 
wireless networks, e.g. rogue access points, open/unsecured networks. These 
networks may not have all the security mechanism enabled and properly config-
ured, thus exposing m-government traffic to security threats.  
• Antivirus / firewall software and latest security patches should be installed in 
handheld devices. Antivirus software can protect the device from malicious code, 
whereas firewall software can prevent network attacks. The aim of security 
patches is to repair newly-discovered exploits of the mobile Operating system. 
All these measures are meant to prevent malicious programmers from gaining 
remote access to the handheld device.  
5   Conclusions 
Nowadays, wireless technologies are becoming more and more popular in all ranges 
of network access, i.e. personal, local, metropolitan and wide. Such technologies have 
been widely acknowledged as complementary channels for two-way transactions be-
tween governments, citizens and businesses. As the mobile devices, networks and 
application evolve m-government services will have to be provided through flexible 
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and adjustable systems which can support different kinds of connections and termi-
nals. Past implementations of wireless protocols have presented a number of security 
vulnerabilities, but latest protocols such as 3G and WiMAX seem to have the requi-
site maturity for secure deployment and utilization. However, the majority of wireless 
equipment utilized today has been manufactured based on older versions of wireless 
protocols and it is still exposed to security threats. Thus, additional security measures 
and policies have to be taken into account while deploying sensitive mobile services, 
such as m-government services.  
In this paper, we have discussed about the security deficiencies of wireless net-
works and we have presented an analysis of the available security protocols. We have 
described a list of policies which should be adopted by the operator and the users of 
the m-government system, so that security awareness can be increased and attacks can 
be avoided. These measures and policies produce a large overhead for both service 
providers and users, but new alternative technologies and systems emerge, such as 
PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) SIM, which seem more promising. PKI SIM is an 
enhanced SIM card, which incorporates a digital certificate (Siltanen, 2000). This 
certificate is used to authenticate the user, so no username/password credentials are 
needed. Furthermore, it can be utilized as a digital signature for document signing and 
email signing. Since wireless technologies are constantly evolving, our future work 
has to include technologies such as PKI SIM, which seems promising for unraveling 
security issues. 
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